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T HERE has recently been considerable agitation from the business
community, and particularly from small businesses, against
unfair competition from nonprofit firms.' The source of the unfair-
ness, as the business community sees it, is that nonprofit corporations
often receive special legal privileges that are denied to competing for-
profit firms. Most conspicuous among these privileges is tax exemp-
tion, particularly exemption from federal corporate income taxes.2
One key dispute over the nonprofits' exemption privilege centers on
their unrelated business activities-that is, profit-making activities
that a tax-exempt nonprofit corporation undertakes primarily as a
source of income and that are not otherwise related to the principal
purposes for which the nonprofit was formed and granted tax exemp-
tion. Since 1950, the portion of an exempt nonprofit's net income that
derives from such activities has been subject to the corporate income
tax under the so-called "unrelated business income tax" (UBIT).3
The business community has argued, however, that the tax is cur-
rently too narrowly and loosely defined and requires more rigorous
application. In particular, critics claim that the test of whether
income-producing activities are "related" to an organization's exempt
* Professor of Law, Yale University. Research for this paper was supported by the Yale
Law School and by the Program on Non-Profit Organizations, Institution for Social and
Policy Studies, Yale University. Harvey Dale, Paul DiMaggio, Timothy Goodspeed, William
Klein, John Simon, and Richard Steinberg provided helpful comments on an earlier draft.
I See, e.g., Off. of Advoc., U.S. Small Bus. Admin., Issue Alert: Unfair Competition with
Small Business (1986) [hereinafter Issue Alert]; Off. of Advoc., U.S. Small Bus. Admin.,
Unfair Competition by Nonprofit Organizations with Small Business: An Issue for the 1980s
(1984) [hereinafter Nonprofit Competition]; Calonius, Hutchison, Quade & Risinger, There's
Big Money in the 'Nonprofits,' Newsweek, Jan. 5, 1987, at 38; Davis, Profits vs. Nonprofits:
The Competition Complex, A. Mgmt., Aug. 1986, at 24.
2 Exemption from local property taxes has also been controversial. See infra notes 79-84
and accompanying text. In general, the analysis of corporate income taxation offered here also
applies to property taxation.
3 I.R.C. § 511 (1982).
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purposes and are therefore exempt is too lax and should be substan-
tially broadened.4 In response to these concerns, the House of Repre-
sentatives recently held extensive hearings on the UBIT that resulted
in draft proposals for legislation to further tighten the tax.5
In light of this agitation, it is striking that the three most prominent
scholarly articles dealing with the UBIT-two written by legal schol-
ars6 and one by an economist 7 -all reject the argument that the UBIT
is necessary or useful in policing competition between nonprofit and
for-profit firms. Indeed, the most recent of these articles' explicitly
argues, and another 9 strongly implies, that the UBIT should be com-
pletely repealed and that we should return to the regime that pre-
vailed before 1950 when businesses wholly owned by tax-exempt
nonprofits were entirely exempt from income taxation. Moreover,
this view seems to be shared by other prominent tax law scholars with
whom I have spoken.
In this Article, I reexamine the purposes and consequences of the
UBIT in an effort to provide a coherent foundation for the current
policy debate and reach the following conclusions. First, the debate
over the UBIT has been muddled by being cast in terms of "fairness,"
4 See, e.g., Issue Alert, supra note 1, at 5-6; Nonprofit Competition, supra note 1, at 27-31,
37-39.
Not surprisingly, the nonprofit sector has sought to defend its privileges, arguing that
further tightening of the UBIT is not necessary and pointing to the substantial benefits
provided to the business sector, and particularly small businesses, through the tax code and
other government programs. See, e.g., H. Wellford & J. Gallagher, The Myth of Unfair
Competition by Nonprofit Organizations: A Review of Government Assistance to Small
Businesses (The National Assembly of National Voluntary Health and Social Welfare
Organizations 1985); S. Pires, Competition Between the Nonprofit and For-Profit Sectors (The
National Assembly of National Voluntary Health and Social Welfare Organizations 1985).
5 Unrelated Business Income Tax: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the
House Comm. on Ways and Means, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) [hereinafter Hearings]. On
June 23, 1988, the House Subcommittee on Oversight forwarded to the Committee on Ways
and Means a draft of preliminary proposals for the reform of the UBIT. Subcomm. on
Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., Draft Report
Describing Recommendations on the Unrelated Business Income Tax (Comm. Print 1988)
[hereinafter Draft Report].
6 See Bittker & Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations from Federal Income
Taxation, 85 Yale L.J. 299, 316-26 (1976); Klein, Income Taxation and Legal Entities, 20
UCLA L. Rev. 13, 61-68 (1972).
7 See Rose-Ackerman, Unfair Competition and Corporate Income Taxation, 34 Stan. L.
Rev. 1017 (1982).
8 See id. at 1038-39.
9 See Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 6, at 322-26.
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a term that some have interpreted to suggest that the basic issues are
ones of equity. Although issues of equity are involved, they are not of
fundamental importance here; rather, the more basic issues concern
economic efficiency. Second, when viewed in terms of efficiency, the
argument for retaining the UBIT in roughly its present form, rather
than repealing it, is overwhelmingly strong. Third, most of the con-
troversy surrounding the UBIT has involved situations in which
exempt nonprofits experience economies of scope in undertaking com-
mercial activities. Although application of the UBIT in such situa-
tions will always be difficult, a clear focus on the underlying
economics reveals reasonable principles on which a more coherent
policy can be based. Finally, despite the pleas of the business commu-
nity, there is no compelling reason for substantially extending the cur-
rent application of the UBIT. Although some broadening of the
scope of the tax may be appropriate, the potential gains in either effi-
ciency or equity appear modest.
In short, the case for either repealing or considerably broadening
the UBIT is weak. On the other hand, there is good reason to believe
that serious reform is called for in defining the scope of the basic
underlying exemption for nonprofit organizations, which is a subject
of far greater consequence than the UBIT.
II. THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE NONPROFIT EXEMPTION
In order to qualify for exemption from corporate income taxation, a
nonprofit must be organized and operated to pursue one or more spe-
cific activities that are listed in the tax code. These activities, which I
shall refer to as "exempt functions," include the provision of services
of broad public benefit, such as charity, education, and scientific
research, as well as narrower activities such as the operation of busi-
ness leagues and cemetery associations."0 Those nonprofits, such as
the American Automobile Association, that are not dedicated to one
or another exempt function remain subject to the corporate tax.11
Though one may fairly question whether all of the activities currently
10 The purposes qualifying for exemption are listed in I.R.C. § 501(c) (West 1988).
11 See Chattanooga Auto. Club v. Commissioner, 182 F.2d 551 (6th Cir. 1950) (automobile
service club not exempt); Gen. Couns. Mem. 23,688 (1943), modified, Rev. Rul. 69-635, 1969-
2 C.B. 126 (same).
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exempted deserve that privilege, for purposes of discussing the UBIT
I shall take the scope of the underlying nonprofit exemption as given.
Exempt nonprofits have always been permitted to own and operate
businesses that produce goods and services unrelated to their exempt
purposes without losing their exemption, so long as such business
activity is not too substantial a portion of a nonprofit's total activities.
The prototypical and most familiar unrelated business is the Mueller
Macaroni Company, which for nearly forty years was wholly owned
by New York University, which used the company's profits to support
the university's law school.12 Prior to 1950, as noted above, income
from wholly owned businesses of this sort-whether or not they were
separately incorporated 3-was also exempt from corporate tax so
long as the income was used only to support the nonprofit's exempt
functions.
The UBIT's enactment, as part of the Revenue Act of 1950,14
reversed that policy, and nonprofits have paid taxes on income
derived from such businesses ever since. Subchapter F (Exempt
Organizations) contains the statutory framework for the UBIT, and
requires that most nonprofits 15 pay taxes equal to the corporate tax
rate times the amount of income derived from any unrelated trade or
business. 16
When discussing profit-making activities conducted by nonprofits,
it is helpful to distinguish between those activities that exhibit econo-
mies of scope when undertaken jointly with the nonprofit's exempt
functions and those activities that exhibit no such economies of scope.
Economies of scope are present if the activity is less costly when
12 See infra note 20.
13 To apply the UBIT to wholly owned businesses that are separately incorporated but not
to those that are operated within the parent firm's nonprofit corporate shell would simply give
rise to a strong incentive to formally merge unrelated businesses into the parent to avoid the
tax. For this reason, it will be assumed throughout the Article that, in the absence of the
JBIT, the regime would be as it was before the UBIT was enacted in 1950, when exemption
was extended not only to unrelated businesses operated within the parent nonprofit's corporate
shell but also to separately incorporated "feeder" corporations.
14 Ch. 994, §§ 421-422, 64 Stat. 906, 947.
15 Charitable trusts, however, calculate the UBIT with individual tax rates. I.R.C. § 511(b)
(1982).
16 Id. § 511(a)(1) (1982). For a survey of the law's development prior to the UBIT's
enactment, see Note, Colleges, Charities, and the Revenue Act of 1950, 60 Yale L.J. 851, 853-
54, 861-63 (1951). The present application of the UBIT is extensively discussed in B. Hopkins,
The Law of Tax-Exempt Organizations 697-806 (5th ed. 1987).
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undertaken in combination with the nonprofit's exempt functions
than when undertaken separately. Rental of a university's football
stadium to professional sports teams over the summer, for example,
would fall in this category; because the university would maintain
such a stadium for its own winter sports programs,1" the additional
cost involved in renting it out over the summer is small. In contrast,
there were presumably no economies of scope involved in New York
University's operation of a macaroni company."
In the discussion that follows, I shall first focus on situations in
which unrelated businesses exhibit no economies of scope. Then, in
Part IX, I shall deal with the additional issues that arise when econo-
mies of scope are present.
III. THE COMPETITIVE IMPACT OF TAX-EXEMPT
BUSINEss ACTIVITIES
A major function and purpose of the UBIT is to regulate competi-
tion between nonprofit and for-profit firms.19 Consequently, it helps
to begin by considering the likely consequences of permitting non-
profit firms to enter profit-making businesses without being subject to
corporate income taxation. In other words, what would the world
look like without the UBIT?
At the time that the UBIT was enacted, some argued that without
the tax businesses owned by exempt nonprofits would exploit their
cost advantage to drive their for-profit competitors out of business. In
this way, it was said, whole industries might ultimately be captured
by nonprofits.2" For reasons explained shortly, however, fears of
great business dislocations are probably unfounded. Indeed, it is not
obvious that, if the UBIT were entirely repealed, owners of existing
for-profit businesses would on average suffer any losses at all.
17 1 assume in this illustration that, as is the case under current law, providing athletic
activities for students is an exempt function. Whether they should instead be considered
unrelated business activities is discussed in Kaplan, Intercollegiate Athletics and the Unrelated
Business Income Tax, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 1430, 1437-60 (1980).
18 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
19 See H.R. Rep. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 36-37 (1950); S. Rep. No. 2375, 81st Cong.,
2d Sess. 28-29, reprinted in 1950 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3053.
20 Thus, fear was expressed that the New York University Law School might come to
monopolize the macaroni business through their ownership of the Mueller Macaroni
Company. See Note, The Macaroni Monopoly: The Developing Concept of Unrelated
Business Income of Exempt Organizations, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1280, 1281 (1968).
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This conclusion holds regardless of one's view of the economic dis-
tortions engendered by the corporate income tax-a much-debated
subject.21 For example, it is sometimes said that the corporate income
tax is in effect just a tax on pure profits and does not affect the cost of
capital at the margin. Under this view, exemption from the tax does
not reduce marginal costs, and exempt businesses enjoy no competi-
tive advantage over taxable ones.z" If this view were accurate, the
failure to implement the UBIT would pose no threat to for-profit
firms.
The more compelling view, on the other hand, is that the corporate
income tax does affect the cost of capital at the margin and that,
everything else being equal, tax-exempt corporations have higher
rates of return on investment than those of taxable firms.23 Thus, tax-
exempt firms can earn a profit at prices below those at which taxable
firms can break even. It might seem to follow that, in the UBIT's
absence, a nonprofit that owns an unrelated business would have an
incentive to expand that business by lowering its prices below the level
at which competing nonexempt firms can make profits and thereby
force those firms out of business.
Yet despite that intuition, widespread displacement of for-profit
firms should not result from the UBIT's absence. As previous com-
mentators have noted,24 a nonprofit firm that owns an unrelated busi-
21 For an accessible survey of some of the main issues, see R. Brealey & S. Myers, Principles
of Corporate Finance 408-20 (3rd ed. 1988). The relevant economics literature is briefly
surveyed in Rose-Ackerman, supra note 7, at 1025 nn.30-31.
22 This argument is made in Note, supra note 16, at 876. The same argument appears to be
offered in Note, Preventing the Operation of Untaxed Business by Tax-Exempt Organizations,
32 U. Chi. L. Rev. 581, 591-92 (1965), although it could also be interpreted as making an
argument similar to that offered infra notes 24-26 and accompanying text; see Note, supra, at
592 n.62.
23 An important reason for this is that debt and equity are not always perfect substitutes.
Differences between those two financing methods include: (1) debt involves agency and
transaction costs that can be avoided to some extent by equity financing; (2) the returns to debt
are taxed differently than the returns to equity in the hands of individual security holders; and
(3) the Internal Revenue Service is likely to treat debt like equity when a firm comes close to
100% debt financing. See R. Brealey & S. Myers, supra note 21, at 408-20; Rose-Ackerman,
supra note 7, at 1025 nn.30-31.
24 See Klein, supra note 6, at 64-66; Rose-Ackerman, supra note 7, at 1029.
One student argues that serious price competition from unrelated businesses owned by
exempt nonprofits would be unlikely even in the absence of the UBIT, but then seems to make
the following contradictory argument: because, without the UBIT, unrelated businesses
owned by exempt nonprofits would have larger earnings than those of their taxable
competitors, they could expand more quickly than could those competitors, and thus a rule
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ness has an incentive to expand that business slowly if at all. In this
manner, the nonprofit leaves undisturbed the price that prevails when
only for-profit firms compete, and thereby maximizes the difference
between cost and sales price. Nonprofits with substantial funds to
invest-more than can be accommodated with ease in a single market
or industry without entering on a scale, or expanding at a rate, suffi-
cient to drive down prices-would have an incentive to spread those
funds across a number of markets or industries and invest on a small
scale in each industry to avoid disturbing existing price levels. Simi-
larly, if a firm owned and operated as an investment a nonprofit that
generated large earnings-earnings large enough so that, if reinvested
in the firm, they would lead to a substantial increase in output and a
consequent lowering of industry price levels-the nonprofit would
have an incentive to withdraw a large portion of those earnings from
the firm and invest them elsewhere.25 Such a strategy would assure
the maximum rate of return on investments in unrelated businesses.
At the price level needed to cover costs for a for-profit firm paying
taxes, a tax-exempt firm could potentially earn pure profits at least
equal to the amount of taxes that would otherwise be assessed. Rapid
increases in capacity through internal expansion would often reduce
the price level and, hence, the rate of profit.
As a consequence, one would expect only a gradual displacement of
for-profit firms even in the absence of the UBIT; no great dislocations
should result from nonprofit entry or expansion.26 Indeed, in the
absence of the UBIT, one would expect nonprofit firms in most cases
to displace for-profit firms, not by driving them out of business
should be adopted requiring such businesses to distribute a large fraction of their profits rather
than reinvesting them. See Note, supra note 16, at 876.
25 There is no tax cost to an exempt nonprofit from shifting funds among its unrelated
businesses even if those businesses are separately incorporated because there is no separate tax
on amounts distributed by those businesses to the parent nonprofit. Thus, the amount or cost
of funds available to a business subsidiary of an exempt nonprofit is not a function of the
amount of profits that a particular business has earned in the past. This point seems to have
been missed by one student who argues that "the fast accumulation of capital made possible by
tax-free profits is an advantage" that unrelated businesses owned by nonprofits would have
over their competitors. Note, supra note 20, at 1282. Such an argument may apply to the
portfolio of unrelated businesses owned by a nonprofit taken as a whole; it does not, however,
apply to individual unrelated businesses.
26 It must be kept in mind that we are concerned here with unrelated businesses that exhibit
no economies of scope when operated by a nonprofit. Where such economies are present, a
different analysis is called for, as discussed infra Part IX.
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through price competition but rather by purchasing them. Although
it has been argued that there are no potential tax gains from such
purchases, in fact such gains would be substantial: without the UBIT,
any business currently subject to the corporate income tax would
yield a higher return in the hands of an exempt nonprofit than it does
to its current shareholders because the corporate-level tax would be
eliminated by such a transfer.27 Moreover, purchasing has the advan-
tage of permitting a nonprofit to take advantage of its exemption with-
out requiring the wasteful duplication of assets and expensive price
competition that would result if nonprofits sought to displace for-
profits by expanding existing unrelated businesses or starting up new
ones.28  Moreover, if, as seems likely, nonprofits generally adopted
this approach, owners of existing for-profit businesses might on aver-
age actually gain from repeal of the UBIT because the competitive
environment in which they sold their products would be largely unaf-
fected while the price at which they could sell their businesses would
rise.29
27 Professor Klein argues that there would be no incentive to transfer assets from a tax-
paying corporation to an unrelated business owned by an exempt nonprofit corporation even in
the absence of the UBIT. Klein's argument, however, assumes that the assets would be
transferred through a sale of assets by the tax-paying corporation to the nonprofit: the
proceeds of the sale would then still be subject to the corporate tax in the hands of the seller.
See Klein, supra note 6, at 61-66. But the way to structure such a transaction to take
advantage of the exemption is to have the shareholders of the tax-paying corporation sell the
entire corporation to the nonprofit, not just its assets. Because the corporation would be
taxable in the hands of its initial shareholders, and exempt in the hands of the nonprofit, it
would be worth more to the latter wherever the corporation had a positive tax liability prior to
the transfer, and the proceeds of the sale would not be taxed to the selling shareholders at a
rate appreciably higher than the rate of tax on the distributions the shareholders would receive
from the corporation if they were to retain ownership.
This is also true even where-as in practice has often been the case-the corporate income
tax acts as a relative subsidy in the sense that a business is subject to a lower rate of tax when
organized as a corporation than as a partnership or sole proprietorship. So long as there is any
positive tax liability under the corporate tax, that liability could potentially be avoided by sale
to a nonprofit in the absence of the UBIT.
28 Because there are mutual gains available to a for-profit corporation and a potential tax-
exempt competitor from having the latter purchase the former rather than from driving it out
of business through price competition, it should generally be possible to arrange such a sale so
that it would be attractive to both parties.
29 Just because an incorporated business would be worth more, after taxes, in the hands of
an exempt nonprofit than in the hands of its original shareholders does not mean that all such
businesses would be sold to nonprofits. Nonprofits would first have to obtain the capital to
purchase such businesses. Moreover, because a nonprofit cannot sell equity, it is dependent on
donations, retained earnings, and debt as sources of capital. The first two sources are
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IV. THE FAIRNESS DEBATE
Observing that, for reasons such as those just discussed, existing
profit-seeking firms would be unlikely to suffer substantial losses
through competition from unrelated businesses owned by nonprofits
even in the absence of the UBIT, some commentators have argued
that the UBIT is therefore unnecessary and that the fears of "unfair
competition" that supposedly justify the tax are unfounded.30 Indeed,
it has been argued that unfair competition is likely to be an even more
serious problem with the UBIT than without it: with the UBIT in
effect, nonprofit firms have especially strong incentives to invest in
related businesses and avoid investment in unrelated businesses. In
turn, this means that those for-profit firms that compete with non-
profits in the related fields will bear most of the disadvantage of tax-
favored competition from nonprofit firms.3'
Such analyses interpret the term "unfair competition" as referring
only to situations in which substantial losses are suffered by for-profit
firms at the hands of competitors that are specially favored by the
government. Indeed, it has sometimes been said that unfair competi-
tion exists only when for-profit firms suffer unforeseeable losses of this
sort.3 2 Pushed to the extreme, it follows from this view that problems
of unfair competition generally arise only in transitions from one tax
regime to another because that is usually the only time at which sub-
stantial unforeseeable tax-induced losses can arise. Thus, if the UBIT
were repealed, for-profit firms in all industries would eventually adjust
their expectations, and hence their levels of investment, to incorporate
the possibility of competition from tax-exempt nonprofits, and would
on average achieve a competitive rate of return. Under such a view,
serious problems of unfair competition would never have arisen if the
UBIT had never been enacted in the first place.
The principal difficulty with such analyses is that they take the
term "unfair" too literally and conceive of the issue primarily as one
ultimately limited. The ability to finance such purchases with debt is discussed infra notes 47-
53 and accompanying text.
30 See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 7, at 1038; R. Steinberg, Fairness and Efficiency in the
Competition Between For-Profit and Nonprofit Firms (Feb. 1988) (unpublished manuscript on
file with the Virginia Law Review Association). Professor Steinberg acknowledges, however,
that efficiency considerations must also be taken into account in evaluating the UBIT.
31 See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 7, at 1038.
32 See id. at 1025-26.
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of equity. In other words, they view the problem only in distribu-
tional terms and simply ask whether, in the absence of the UBIT,
there would be substantial undeserved redistributions of wealth from
one group to another-and in particular from for-profit firms to the
nonprofits with which they compete. The more serious problems
addressed by the UBIT, however, involve efficiency. And, substantial
economic inefficiency could be generated by the absence of the UBIT
even if no owner of an existing profit-seeking business ever suffered
losses as a result of competition from unrelated businesses owned by
exempt nonprofits.
V. THE EFFICIENCY RATIONALE FOR THE UBIT
Failure to apply the corporate tax to unrelated businesses operated
by exempt nonprofits could result in a variety of inefficiencies.
A. Poor Diversification of Investments
At present, most nonprofits with substantial financial reserves, such
as endowed universities, private foundations, and pension funds,
invest a substantial portion of those reserves in shares of common
stock. Although these shares represent fractional ownership of the
business corporations that issue them, their ownership by exempt
nonprofits confers no fractional exemption from corporate income
taxation for the issuing entities. Thus, if a university endowment
holds five percent of the shares of the XYZ corporation, the tax code
does not forgive five percent of the taxes otherwise owed by the XYZ
corporation. Rather, the dividends paid to the university by the XYZ
corporation, like those paid to other shareholders, are distributed
after corporate taxes.
If the UBIT were repealed, however, this result would no longer
hold true for corporations that are 100% owned by exempt nonprofits
because such corporations would share the exemption. In other
words, the acquisition of all common stock would convert the issuer
into an exempt, unrelated business. (This is based on the assumption
that, without the UBIT, the situation would be as it was before 1950,
with the exemption extended only to unrelated businesses that are
wholly owned by an otherwise exempt nonprofit.) As a result, the tax
treatments of unrelated businesses in which a nonprofit has only par-
tial ownership and those that it wholly owns would differ substan-
tially, and nonprofits would have a strong incentive to abandon the
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current practice of investing in a broad range of common stocks and
to pursue instead a strategy of investing in firms that the nonprofits
can completely own.
The result would be to create a strong incentive for many nonprof-
its to adopt investment portfolios that are very poorly diversified.
Nonprofits with extremely large portfolios, such as the best-endowed
universities and private foundations, may have sufficient funds to
achieve reasonable diversification even if they were to invest only in
wholly owned firms. But for most nonprofits, investing entirely in
wholly owned businesses would mean owning only one or a few firms.
As a consequence, the nonprofits would incur substantially increased
investment risks.
This is not to argue that nonprofits would be worse off as a conse-
quence. They would not be. They would still have the option of
investing in a broad range of common stocks as they currently do;
presumably they would choose instead to invest in a few wholly
owned businesses only if they thought the increase in average rate of
return from escaping the corporate tax outweighed the increased risk
they incurred. Rather, the argument is that the increase in federal
subsidy that would flow to nonprofits when they shifted from com-
mon stocks to wholly owned exempt businesses would in part be dissi-
pated in the increased risk thereby incurred by the nonprofits
involved. In other words, the incentive for nonprofits to incur addi-
tional risk would detract importantly from the efficiency of the
subsidy.33
33 One might ask why, if the incentive is so great, nonprofits did not sell their common
stocks and invest entirely in wholly owned businesses before 1950, when there was no UBIT.
There are several possible reasons this did not happen. First, the case that (rather
unexpectedly) interpreted the Code to grant total exemption of "feeder" corporations wholly
owned by exempt nonprofits was decided only in 1938. See Roche's Beach, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 96 F.2d 776 (2d Cir. 1938). Second, corporate tax rates became large only
after the beginning of World War II; in 1931, for example, the maximum rate was only 12%,
and by 1939 it had risen only to 19%, whereas by 1942 it had risen to 53%, at which it
approximately stayed until 1986. See J. Pechman, Federal Tax Policy 321-22 (5th ed. 1987).
Further, there is evidence that in the 1940's, when for the reasons just mentioned the
incentive to invest in wholly owned businesses became strong, exempt nonprofits quickly began
to respond to it. By 1947, for example, New York University had acquired, in addition to the
Mueller Macaroni Company, the American Limoges China Company, the Howes Leather
Company, and the Ramsey Corporation, a manufacturer of piston rings. See Note, supra note





Failure to tax unrelated businesses owned by nonprofits could also
engender substantial inefficiency in the form of poor management.
Nonprofit firms are essentially unowned organizations. As a conse-
quence, they may feel less incentive to minimize costs or to maximize
revenues than do profit-seeking firms.34 So long as nonprofit firms do
not benefit from special subsidies, market selection can serve as a
check in this regard: nonprofit firms will succeed in unrelated busi-
nesses only if they are at least as efficient as their for-profit competi-
tors. But when businesses operated by nonprofits are exempted from
being taxed, market selection is lost as a test of efficiency: nonprofits
can survive in competition with for-profit firms even when nonprofits
have higher costs. Consequently, some or even all of the value of tax
exemption-that is, of the tax revenues forgone by the government-
could simply be lost in inefficient operation of the unrelated businesses
through which the subsidy is channeled to the nonprofits.35
To be sure, nonprofit firms that own unrelated businesses presuma-
bly have much the same kind of interest in those firms that any other
owner would have-namely, to maximize the financial return they
yield. Thus, whatever the efficiency of their behavior in other
respects, nonprofits owning such businesses might be expected to take
as strong an interest in having them managed efficiently as would any
other owner. But not all owners are equally effective, and the UBIT's
repeal would create a strong incentive for some very inefficient pat-
terns of ownership.
Consider, for example, the case of a private college with $100 mil-
lion in endowment, which is reasonably large by current standards. 36
In the absence of the UBIT, as noted above, there would be a very
strong incentive for the college to invest that endowment in wholly
34 See, e.g., Frech, The Property Rights Theory of the Firm: Empirical Results from a
Natural Experiment, 84 J. Pol. Econ. 143, 147-51 (1976) (presenting empirical evidence
suggesting that nonprofit insurance companies are less efficient than proprietary insurance
companies).
35 Cf. Rose-Ackerman, supra note 7, at 1024 (explicitly assuming for purposes of analysis
that nonprofit firms manage unrelated businesses as efficiently as do investor-owned firms and,
therefore, not dealing with this issue).
36 Of the roughly 300 colleges and universities with endowments in excess of $1 million,
about 90 have endowments worth more than $100 million. See Growth of College
Endowments Found to Have Slowed Last Year; Value of 296 Funds Placed at $47.9-Billion,
Chron. Higher Educ., June 1, 1988, at A33, col. I.
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owned firms rather than in a diversified portfolio of common stocks.
Thus, the college might obtain full ownership of, for example, five
relatively small businesses with $20 million in equity capital each.
The efficiency with which those businesses were managed would then
depend very much on the quality of oversight provided by the college
because there would be no market in the stocks of the firms in ques-
tion (and in particular no market for corporate control); the officers of
the college would be entirely responsible for selecting and monitoring
the managers of the firms. In effect, the college would become a con-
glomerate. And, if the college sought diversification in its invest-
ments, and thus purchased businesses in five entirely different
industries, it would become a highly diversified conglomerate.37 The
track record of conglomerates managed by large and sophisticated
for-profit corporations is not impressive; there is little reason to
believe that a private college would do better, or even nearly so well.
Tax exemption for unrelated businesses is, consequently, a poor
way to subsidize nonprofit firms. It would be far more effective for
the government simply to give nonprofit firms direct grants equal to
the tax revenue that would be lost through exemption of unrelated
business activities.
The same reasoning does not apply to the related activities of non-
profits-that is, to those activities included among nonprofits' exempt
functions. The rationale for granting tax exemption to nonprofits that
perform these functions, such as aiding the poor or performing scien-
tific research, is presumably that the services involved would be
underprovided in the absence of a subsidy. 8 Thus, one need not
worry, as does one commentator,39 about the bias that the UBIT cre-
ates in favor of investment by nonprofits in related as opposed to
unrelated business activities, for that is precisely the result that is
desired from the point of view of efficiency.4
37 This was in effect the strategy followed by New York University prior to the adoption of
the UBIT. See supra note 33.
38 For these two particular services, underprovision arguably results because they are, for
many persons, public goods in the economist's sense. See Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit
Enterprise, 89 Yale L.J. 835, 848-51, 854-62 (1980) (discussing this and other forms of market
failure that characterize services commonly provided by nonprofits).
39 See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 7, at 1038.
40 There remains the question of why the subsidy-that is, the exemption-is offered to
nonprofit firms but not to for-profit firms. There are at least two possible reasons for this.
First, the market for the service to be subsidized is insufficiently competitive to assure that for-
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C. Corporate Tax Integration for Exempt Nonprofits
The two problems described above-incentives for underdiversifica-
tion and for managerial inefficiency-might largely be avoided by not
just repealing the UBIT but also granting partial exemption from cor-
porate income taxes for those corporations whose stock is partially
held by nonprofit organizations. This might be accomplished, for
example, by refunding to exempt nonprofits the fraction of the corpo-
ration's taxes that corresponds to the fraction of the corporation's
stock owned by the nonprofit. In effect, this would provide for inte-
gration of the corporate and personal income taxes so far as nonprof-
its are concerned.
Such a scheme would not, however, eliminate all difficulties. In
addition to whatever administrative costs it would involve (which
would probably be manageable, but not negligible, for the IRS, the
nonprofits, and the business corporations involved), it would aggra-
vate the other problems, discussed in the next Section, that would
accompany repeal of the UBIT, including skewed incentives for sav-
ing and erosion of the corporate tax base.41
D. Saving Versus Spending
To exempt from taxation all unrelated businesses owned by non-
profit organizations would be to give those entities a higher rate of
return on investment and of savings than is available to tax-paying
corporations. As a result, without the UBIT, nonprofit firms might
have too strong an incentive to save instead of spending currently,
leading them to underfund current projects in order to build up their
profit firms would be forced to pass to their customers most or all of the benefit of the subsidy.
Second, for-profit firms, for reasons of asymmetric information or "contract failure" will
provide services of inferior quality to those offered by nonprofit firms. See Hansmann, The
Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations from Corporate Income Taxation, 91 Yale
L.J. 54, 69-70 (1981) [hereinafter Hansmann, Exempting Rationale]; Hansmann, supra note
38, at 843-45.
Moreover, there is empirical evidence suggesting that exemption from corporate income
taxes for nonprofit firms in specific industries is effective at significantly increasing the market
share of nonprofit vis-a-vis for-profit firms. See Hansmann, The Effect of Tax Exemption and
Other Factors on the Market Share of Nonprofit Versus For-Profit Firms, 40 Nat'l Tax J. 71,
76-77 (1987).
41 The immediate loss of tax revenue would obviously be large, for example, if such a




investments. Universities, for example, would have a strong incentive
to cut current spending on research, teaching, and student scholar-
ships and to invest the money thereby saved in unrelated businesses. 42
To be sure, the returns to those investments would be available to
spend on more research, teaching, and scholarships in the future.
Because the university would earn a much higher rate of return to
savings than is available through other organizations, 43 however, it
would value such future expenditures, relative to present expendi-
tures, much more highly than does the society at large. Thus, tax
exemption for unrelated businesses would distort the university's (or
any other nonprofit's) choice between present and future expenditures
by subsidizing expenditures in the future. The exemption would
result in a larger overall amount of services from the university, but
too many of those services would be provided in the future.4 A sub-
sidy of equal cost to the government (in terms of present discounted
value at current-that is, after-tax-interest rates) that did not have
such a bias in favor of future production would produce a stream of
42 It is hard to say unambiguously whether repeal of the UBIT would lead nonprofits
actually to cut their current absolute levels of expenditure. Repeal of the UBIT would have
both an income effect and a substitution effect: the former would encourage nonprofits to
increase current expenditures, whereas the latter would have the opposite effect. The net result
in any particular case depends on, among other things, the nonprofit's objectives.
43 See infra note 44.
44 Because it is ultimately the decisions and welfare of individuals that are affected by the
tax system, it helps to view the issue in terms of its impact on ultimate consumers of services.
For example, imagine an individual who has $100 currently in hand. She is contemplating
whether to purchase $100 of some service (such as a haircut or an education) with those funds
now, or alternatively to postpone consumption until next year. If she postpones consumption,
she can proceed in several different ways.
First, she can invest the $100 in an incorporated business for the intervening year, disinvest
at the end of the year, and use the amount invested plus net returns to purchase the service.
Let us suppose, for simplicity, that the corporate tax rate is 34% and that her personal rate is
33%. And assume that the corporation obtains a 20% rate of return before tax. Then, at the
end of the year, she will be able to purchase $108.84 worth of services, using the original $100
plus the $20 corporate earnings minus taxes of 34% at the corporate level and 33% at the
personal level.
Second, she can pay $100 this year to a for-profit corporation, which will invest the funds for
the year in other projects and then use the capital and net returns next year to provide the
services directly to her. The corporation gets $20 in earnings from using the funds, and pays
$6.80 in taxes, leaving it with a total of $13.20 with which to provide services for the
purchaser.
Third, she can pay $100 this year to an exempt nonprofit, which will invest the funds in an
unrelated business and use the proceeds to provide services directly to her next year. If we
assume that the nonprofit is also able to get a 20% rate of return before tax on its unrelated
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services from the university that would have a higher value to society
(again, in terms of present discounted value).
Creating a tax bias in favor of saving might be unobjectionable if
nonprofit organizations would otherwise be excessively inclined to
spend rather than save-that is, to be too present-oriented. But there
is every reason to believe that the reverse is the case. Even with the
UBIT, nonprofit organizations tend to have a strong-perhaps unde-
sirably strong-tendency to save rather than spend. Thus many non-
profits, such as universities, have already accumulated large capital
surpluses in the form of endowments. The preferences of donors, who
often wish to build monuments to themselves and thus prefer giving
endowed funds rather than funds that can be spent currently, is one
source of bias in favor of saving. Another may be a desire on the part
of those who administer nonprofits to establish career security for
themselves, as well as freedom from outside pressures, by accumulat-
ing financial reserves that limit their dependence on current revenue
sources."a Whatever the source, however, nonprofits arguably already
have too strong an inclination toward the accumulation of financial
assets, and this tendency would be considerably reinforced by the
absence of the UBIT.
Conceding the strength of the preceding arguments, it might never-
theless be argued that repeal of the UBIT is justified as a second-best
approach to tax incentives. The corporate income tax, as presently
structured, creates a bias against saving and investment. Encouraging
investment by nonprofits by exempting their unrelated business activi-
ties from the corporate tax could be seen as a partial corrective to this
bias. It is not at all clear, however, that any benefits along these lines
would not be outweighed by the inefficiencies engendered by the
business projects and if unrelated businesses are exempt from the corporate tax, the nonprofit
will then be able to provide $120 worth of services for her.
She will, therefore, be much more inclined to forgo current consumption in favor of future
consumption if she can structure the transaction in the third way rather than in the first or
second ways.
Transactions are, in effect, often structured in this third way. For example, when a donor
seeks to purchase educational services for third parties by donating to a university, she is using
the third way if she makes the donation in the form of endowment.
45 The reasons why nonprofits such as universities exhibit such a strong tendency to
accumulate financial reserves in the form of endowments is explored in detail in Hansmann,
Why Do Universities Have Endowments? (Jan. 1989) (unpublished manuscript on file with the
Virginia Law Review Association).
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absence of the UBIT. Moreover, there are far more direct ways to
eliminate the antisaving bias in the corporate tax, such as a straight-
forward effort at integration of the corporate and personal taxes.
E. Subsidy Unrelated to Needs
All subsidies necessarily create some inefficiency through adminis-
trative costs and skewed incentives. If the subsidy serves a good pur-
pose, these costs may be worth bearing. Failing to tax the unrelated
business activities of exempt profits, however, would create a very
poorly structured subsidy.
There is no reason to believe that the amount of subsidy that is
appropriate for a particular nonprofit is proportional to its willingness
or ability to invest in unrelated businesses-although that would in
effect be the type of subsidy that would result if the UBIT were
repealed. Rather, the contrary is arguably the case. When a non-
profit organization invests substantial sums in unrelated businesses it
presumably either has more funds at its disposal than it can invest
productively in its related activities (in which case further subsidy is
obviously inappropriate) or else it is diverting funds away from
related activities where they are needed and into unrelated businesses
where for-profit firms would provide an adequate level of investment
in any case. In short, exempting unrelated businesses from taxation
would yield a subsidy inversely proportional to the needs46 and social
contributions of the recipient nonprofits. Subsidies for nonprofits
should be structured to encourage them to expand their related, not
their unrelated, activities.
VI. TAx BASE SHRINKAGE
In addition to regulating the balance of business activity between
nonprofit and for-profit firms, the UBIT has the important purpose of
raising revenue for the government. To be sure, the UBIT itself yields
46 I have suggested, in another article, that corporate income tax exemption for some types
of nonprofit firms might be justified as a crude way of compensating for nonprofits' difficulties
in raising capital. Hansmann, Exempting Rationale, supra note 40, at 72-75. Exemption of
unrelated business activities from the corporate tax, however, is difficult to justify on these




few tax dollars,4 7 and probably always will no matter how it is
reformed. Observing this, some commentators have claimed that the
UBIT plays little part in raising revenue.48 But this argument misses
the essential point. The UBIT is far more important in protecting the
corporate income tax base than it is in raising revenue directly.
For several reasons, the UBIT's repeal would noticeably shrink the
corporate tax base. As described earlier in Part V, exempt nonprofits
with endowments invested in a diversified portfolio of common stocks
would have a strong incentive to sell those stocks and purchase
instead wholly owned, and thus exempt, businesses. This would
directly reduce the corporate tax base roughly in proportion to the
amount of corporate securities currently held by exempt nonprofits.
The greatest reduction in the corporate tax base that would follow
from repeal of the UBIT, however, would probably come from debt-
financed acquisitions of business corporations by exempt nonprofits.
In the absence of the UBIT, the value of an otherwise taxable business
would be higher in the hands of an exempt nonprofit than it would be
in the hands of ordinary taxable entrepreneurs or shareholders. Thus,
there would be a potential gain from the sale of a business to a non-
profit equal to the discounted present value of all the future taxes that
the business would otherwise pay. Leveraged financing should there-
fore be readily available for such a purchase, and nonprofits would
likely often borrow a very large fraction, and in many cases perhaps
close to 100%, of the capital needed for the acquisition of an unre-
lated business. The increased net income resulting from tax avoid-
ance would provide the return necessary to cover the increased
agency and transaction costs involved in such highly leveraged financ-
ing.49 As a consequence, even nonprofits with modest net assets could
hold large portfolios of business firms. In fact, as part of the rationale
for enacting the UBIT in 1950, Congress cited the frequency with
which exempt organizations were then acquiring businesses with no
investment of their own. 50
47 In fiscal year 1986, tax revenue from the UBIT was $53 million. Hearings, supra note 5,
at 28 (statement of 0. Donaldson Chapoton, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Department of the
Treasury).
48 See, e.g., Note, supra note 16, at 875.
49 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
50 House Comm. on Ways and Means, Report on the Revenue Act of 1950, H.R. Rep. No.
2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 36-37 (1950).
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The shrinkage of the corporate tax base that could result from
leveraged acquisitions of businesses by exempt nonprofits 5' would pre-
sumably be so obviously undesirable that repeal of the UBIT would
have to be accompanied by strong restrictions on the use of debt
financing in acquisitions by nonprofits. The Internal Revenue Code
already imposes a tax on the "unrelated debt-financed income" of
nonprofits, which is essentially all debt-financed unrelated business
income that is not otherwise subject to the UBIT.5 2 But restrictions
on debt financing are complex and difficult to police, and if the UBIT
were repealed, the returns from avoiding any such restrictions would
be sufficiently high that one would expect nonprofits, and the business
firms owned by them, to borrow wherever and however they could
without formally exceeding those restrictions. For example, both
nonprofits and their for-profit subsidiaries would always face a strong
temptation to lease rather than purchase, to seek trade credit wher-
ever possible, or to encourage donors to make gifts currently and
withhold a lifetime income interest rather than making a testamentary
gift. The effort that would be required of the government to define
and police barriers to such uses of debt, and the effort that would be
induced in nonprofits to evade these barriers, are thus further costs
that would accompany repeal of the UBIT.13
51 Moreover, leveraged acquisitions may aggravate the other problems discussed above,
such as increased riskiness in nonprofits' investment portfolios, less efficient management of
the businesses involved, and an enlargement of the subsidy that is very poorly proportioned to
the needs of the institutions involved.
52 I.R.C. § 514 (West 1988). This provision taxes the income from otherwise untaxed
unrelated businesses to the extent the business is financed with debt. Thus, if a business were
acquired with 80% debt financing, then 80% of its income would be subject to tax.
Prior to the stiffening of the tax on unrelated debt-financed income in 1969, nonprofits had
managed to take advantage of gaps in the coverage of the UBIT (primarily related to passive
income, discussed infra Part VIII) to engage in transactions whereby they effectively rented
out their exemption to otherwise taxable business corporations. See B. Hopkins, supra note 16,
at 794-95.
53 Another reason, beyond those given supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text, why the
tax receipts from the UBIT understate that provision's effect on overall tax revenue is that
with the UBIT in effect there is little incentive not to incorporate separately as taxable for-
profit firms many businesses that are wholly owned by exempt nonprofits. See Copeland &




VII. WHEN DOES THE TAIL START WAGGING THE DOG?
In the absence of the UBIT, there would be no logical stopping
point short of granting tax exemption to any business so long as it is
conducted by a nonprofit corporation. To be sure, one might impose
a rule withdrawing the basic tax exemption from a nonprofit firm
when more than a certain percentage of its income or assets came to
be associated with unrelated activities. But on what principle would
the appropriate percentage be determined? Yale, for example, invests
roughly half of its total assets, through its endowment, in unrelated
businesses. 54 If those businesses were wholly owned and tax-exempt,
would we find that these universities were so involved in unrelated
businesses as to threaten their basic exemption? If not, at what level
would that come to pass? Would it occur when ninety percent of an
organization's assets are invested in unrelated businesses?"
Critics of the UBIT respond that all of the returns from unrelated
businesses must ultimately be spent on their related activities and that
this justifies exemption for the unrelated businesses.5 6 But this argu-
ment, without more, presumably applies no matter how small the
related activities are in comparison to the unrelated activities. A
twenty-child day-care center that owns businesses worth $500 million
could presumably make the same argument: even if it is currently
reinvesting most of the earnings from its unrelated businesses in those
or other businesses, the wealth so accumulated nevertheless remains
dedicated, in the long run, to the day-care center because of the
organization's nonprofit charter. The problem is, of course, that the
long run may be very long indeed. In effect, the enterprise is simply
accumulating, perhaps for the satisfaction of its managers, a large
unowned tax-exempt mutual fund. Moreover, this situation is not
meaningfully different from one in which the day care center is simply
omitted.
In short, without the UBIT, we would essentially be in a situation
in which all organizations formed as nonprofit corporations could
secure exemption from the corporate income tax, regardless of the
54 See Hausmann, supra note 45, at 29-30.
55 Currently, there is no formal rule of this sort. Apparently, however, the IRS is likely to
deny or revoke tax exemption for an organization that derives more than half of its income
from unrelated business activities. See B. Hopkins, supra note 16, at 702.
56 See, e.g., Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 6, at 317.
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activities in which they engaged. This underlines the fact that the
rationale for taxing unrelated businesses is basically the same as the
rationale for granting the basic exemption, not to all nonprofit corpo-
rations, but only to those nonprofits that pursue activities deemed
worthy of subsidy; there is no point in subsidizing nonprofit firms to
provide services that can be performed just as efficiently by for-profit
firms. 57
VIII. TREATMENT OF PASSIVE INVESTMENT INCOME
Certain forms of "passive" investment income, including dividends,
interest, royalties, and rental income from real estate, are generally
excluded from the scope of the UBIT 5 8 It has been argued that this
represents a fundamental inconsistency in the taxation of nonprofits
and undercuts the case for the UBIT: If unfair competition is not a
problem with respect to investments producing passive income, then
why should it be a problem with respect to other forms of unrelated
business income?59
There is, however, a strong argument for continuing to exclude
most of these forms of income from the UBIT. This is most obvious
in the case of dividends. As noted in Part V, the fact that an exempt
nonprofit owns a share of stock in a business corporation does not
affect the latter's tax status. Thus, the corporation must pay taxes on
all its earnings; the dividends received by its nonprofit shareholders
are net of the corporate tax. To apply the UBIT to dividend income
would therefore tax that income twice-once at the corporate level
and a second time when received by the nonprofit. In contrast,
income a nonprofit received from wholly owned businesses (or at least
those that were not separately incorporated) would be subjected to the
57 Thus, if corporate tax exemption would not be granted to a ball bearing manufacturer
that changed its form of incorporation from a business corporation to a nonprofit corporation,
such a firm should not be granted an exemption simply because it comes to be owned by a tax-
exempt nonprofit university. Indeed, the rationale for taxing such a firm when it is held as
income-producing property by an exempt nonprofit is even stronger than the rationale for
taxing it when it is separately incorporated as a nonprofit, since in the former case, like any
other taxable business, it is clearly being operated simply to maximize its net revenues.
58 I.R.C. § 512(b)(1)-(3) (1982).
59 See, e.g., Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 6, at 319; Kaplan, supra note 17, at 1466.
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corporate tax only once.' ° - Applying the UBIT to dividend income
therefore would give nonprofits a strong incentive to avoid invest-
ments in common stock that represented less than full ownership of a
company, and instead to invest their funds in wholly owned busi-
nesses, with the unfortunate consequences already described above.
Exclusion from the UBIT of interest income, particularly interest on
corporate bonds, can be supported with similar logic. 61
It is harder to justify the exclusion from the UBIT of rental income
from real estate. One might argue, nevertheless, that investments in
real estate have (for other tax reasons) generally been held in partner-
ship rather than in corporate form and thus usually have not been
subject to the corporate tax in any event. Consequently, excluding
them from the UBIT does not create a strong relative subsidy for non-
profits to pursue such investments. On the other hand, the adoption
of the special tax on debt-financed real estate investments by exempt
nonprofits62 suggests that this exclusion does create undesirable
incentives.63
IX. ECONOMIES OF SCOPE
The preceding discussion has focused on investments that nonprof-
its undertake purely because they produce income. More particu-
larly, it has focused on investments in those businesses in which
nonprofits have no inherent efficiency advantages over for-profit firms.
In some activities, however, a nonprofit can achieve economies of
scope by engaging in a business activity that, while not in itself an
exempt function (in the sense that a nonprofit formed to undertake
that activity alone would qualify for exemption), can be undertaken at
60 Even taxable business corporations, in computing their corporate income tax, are
currently entitled to a deduction of 70% of the dividends they receive from other corporations.
I.R.C. § 243(a)(1) (West 1988).
61 There is no coherent economic logic to support the deductibility, when computing the
basic corporate income tax, of interest but not of dividends. Nevertheless, once we accept this
fundamental inconsistency in the structure of the corporate tax, it becomes inconsistent within
that scheme to exclude from the UBIT dividends received from investments in taxable
corporations but not interest on corporate bonds.
62 See supra Part VI.
63 The special exception for royalty income might also be justifiable in various situations.
For example, following the logic suggested infra note 71, a case can be made for exempting as
"royalties" fees that are received by art museums for licensing the right to make and sell
reproductions of works in their collections.
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lower cost because it exhibits cost complementarities with the non-
profit's exempt functions. Leasing of unused capacity on a university
computer or operation of a commercial pharmacy by a hospital might
be examples. Where true economies of this sort can be achieved, it
will often be efficient for nonprofits to engage in such businesses even
though it would not otherwise be efficient for such businesses to be
conducted by nonprofit firms (that is, even though it would not be
efficient for such a business to be conducted by a nonprofit firm if that
business were the firm's only activity).
A. Principles for Applying the UBIT
Most of the activities that have recently been the focus of contro-
versy concerning the application of the UBIT involve such economies
of scope. This is not surprising, since there are competing considera-
tions at play.
On the one hand, there is a good argument for extending the UBIT
to the returns from such activities. Where true efficiencies are
involved, application of the tax will not discourage nonprofits from
undertaking them; they will still provide a higher rate of return to the
nonprofits than that provided by other unrelated business activities.
In addition, application of the tax will have the desirable effect of
discouraging excessive investment in such activities-for example, the
purchase by a university of a computer that is so large as to exceed
natural economies of scope and that will simply furnish services that
could be provided equally or more efficiently by an independent com-
mercial computing firm. Such logic would support the proposal,
made by some representatives of the business community, that a
"stand-alone" test be adopted under which the UBIT would be
applied to income from any activity that would not qualify as an
exempt function if it were the only activity engaged in by a
nonprofit. 64
On the other hand, there are some good reasons to avoid extending
the UBIT to cover at least some activities of this sort. Application of
the tax in these cases is awkward and administratively costly for both
the government and the nonprofits because it is difficult to allocate
costs in any objective fashion between related and unrelated portions
64 See Hearings, supra note 5, at 105 (testimony of Frank Swain, Chief Counsel for
Advocacy, U.S. Small Business Administration).
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of the activities involved. Further, there is the possibility that,
because the boundary between related and unrelated activities is
vague, the tax will end up being applied also to some related activities.
Finally, we can turn around the argument that nonprofits will engage
in these activities even if taxed, and note that it follows that the tax
will therefore be unnecessary and ineffective at discouraging invest-
ment in such activities.65
Fortunately, it probably does not make a great deal of difference,
from the point of view of economic efficiency, precisely where the line
is drawn in taxing activities of this sort. To maintain appropriate
incentives, there is a strong argument for applying the UBIT at least
at the margin where the magnitude of a nonprofit's investment in an
activity-for example, in a computer-is likely to be governed by the
opportunity to obtain extra commercial income. But in inframarginal
cases in which profits are derived from investments clearly made for
other purposes (as, for example, through the occasional rental of a
stadium built long ago), there is little at stake; from an efficiency point
of view, in the decision as to whether the returns from the activity are
to be taxed, or in the way the accounting is done if taxes are levied,
because the nonprofit will have an incentive to undertake the activity
regardless of whether it is taxed on the earnings it receives.
As a consequence, the applications of the UBIT that are currently
the most controversial are also, in terms of efficiency, the easiest to
resolve: almost any arbitrary solution will do. As a matter of policy,
it is perhaps most sensible simply to seek to draw a line between taxa-
ble and exempt activities at a point where it is reasonably easy to
administer-that is, where the activity involved is sufficiently separa-
ble from the nonprofit's exempt functions so that separate accounting
is not particularly burdensome.
B. Determining "Relatedness"
The current nominal standard for determining whether an activity
falls within the scope of the UBIT is whether that activity is "substan-
tially related" to the nonprofit's exempt functions.66 Because the defi-
nitions of exempt functions and the reasons for exempting them have
always been vague, and because what it means to be "related" has
65 See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
66 I.R.C. § 513(a) (1982).
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never been spelled out well,67 administration of this standard has not
been simple. In practice, the standard has evolved as a "facts and
circumstances" test, and the decisions of the IRS and courts have
been roughly consistent with the principles suggested here to guide
decisions in cases involving economies of scope-although some of
the rules imposed by the Code, and some of the interpretations of the
Code adopted by the IRS and courts, leave room for improvement.68
To see more clearly the types of problems posed by activities exhib-
iting economies of scope, the approaches that are currently taken in
applying the UBIT to such activities, and the ways in which the cur-
rent approaches might be justified or modified in light of the policy
considerations outlined above, it will help to focus on two prototypi-
cal examples.
L Museum Gift Shops
Many art museums operate gift shops from which they derive
income to subsidize their other functions. These shops commonly sell
items of a type that are also available from taxpaying proprietary
stores. The museums may, however, experience some economies of
scope in selling such items: among other things, museum visitors are
precisely the type of people most likely to patronize such a shop and
may be particularly in the mood to purchase art-related items when in
the museum. Consequently, museums are likely to operate such
shops regardless of whether they are subjected to the UIBIT. If all
income from such shops were exempt from the UBIT, however, the
museums would have an incentive to expand them well beyond their
natural economies of scope and develop large stores selling a broad
variety of items to the public at large.69
67 The IRS regulations state that a business is "related" when it "has a causal relationship
to the achievement of exempt purposes (other than through the production of income)."
Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(2) (as amended in 1983). This has the right spirit but does not move
the ball very far.
68 Among the specific statutory provisions governing application of the UBIT, for example,
the exemption for university research activities is surely too broad. See Note, Collaboration
Between Nonprofit Universities and Commercial Enterprises: The Rationale for Exempting
Nonprofit Universities from Federal Income Taxation, 95 Yale L.J. 1857, 1866-71 (1986).
Like most other conspicuous gaps in the current coverage of the UBIT, this will be largely
remedied if the House committee proposals in Draft Report, supra note 5, are adopted.
69 It might be argued that most or all profits from sales by museum gift shops should be
exempted from tax on the grounds that these profits are essentially donations. People who
purchase items in such shops, it could be argued, in fact often choose to patronize those shops
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Presumably in recognition of this latter point, such shops have not
been completely exempted from the UBIT. Rather, the IRS applies a
"fragmentation rule" to their sales, subjecting the returns from sales
of some types of items to the UBIT while judging sales of other types
of items to be "related" and hence exempt. For example, income
from sales of reproductions of objects in the museum's collection is
generally exempt, whereas income from sales of reproductions of
objects not in the museum's collection, including reproductions of art
objects in other museums, is taxable.
This approach has two principal difficulties. First, it is administra-
tively costly to both the IRS and the museums to be constantly classi-
fying sales, and the resulting income, according to a variety of criteria
that are necessarily often vague. Second, the criteria employed fre-
quently reflect too literal an interpretation of "relatedness" and lose
sight of the underlying purpose of the UBIT. Consider the distinction
employed in the case of reproductions. The question here should be
whether the production and distribution of such reproductions can be
handled just as efficiently by commercial businesses as by nonprofit
art museums. The answer, in general, is probably yes. Presumably an
important reason that art museums are nonprofit is that the marginal
costs of making original masterpieces of art available for public view-
ing are radically below the average costs: although a substantial capi-
tal outlay is necessary to acquire and house such works of art, once
they are on display the marginal cost of admitting another member of
the public to view them is close to zero. Under such circumstances,
financing by public and private donations rather than by admission
charges may be not only the most efficient but also the only feasible
way to operate a museum-and an institution financed by donations
rather than commercial shops, and perhaps purchase more than they otherwise would, because
they understand that the profits from the purchases will be used to support the museum.
(Similar logic presumably would not extend to operations such as New York University's
macaroni company because since the purchasers of Mueller macaroni are probably generally
unaware of, and unconcerned about, who ultimately owns the company.) This argument,
however, has two difficulties. First, it is not clear that its underlying empirical supposition-
that people intend to make a donation-is true. Second, it would be very difficult to determine
where to draw the line between taxed and untaxed activities. Such logic has been rejected in
other circumstances. See United States v. American Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105 (1986)




must generally be organized as a nonprofit.70
The uniqueness of the works of art involved, however, is an essen-
tial factor here. The same logic does not apply to reproductions for
which average and marginal cost are very close. Moreover, this is
true regardless of whether they are reproductions of items in the
museum's own collection. For-profit firms can, and commonly do,
make and sell art reproductions. It follows that there is no reason to
subsidize nonprofit firms to engage in such manufacturing and
merchandising.
On the other hand, exempting the ("passive") income a museum
receives from licensing a (taxable) business firm to make and market
reproductions of items in the museum's collection may be sensible: it
is not an activity that a for-profit firm could perform instead. The
museum's incentive to do it is unlikely to be affected by whether it is
taxed on the proceeds; and exempting such profits produces a subsidy
that is neatly proportioned to the publicly valuable service that the
museum provides, which is acquiring expensive art works for display
at low or no fees.71
The IRS employs other criteria to distinguish between taxable and
nontaxable sales by museum gift shops, but those seem no more
defensible.72 As a consequence, it might make better sense simply to
abandon such distinctions and make all museum gift shop income
subject to the UBIT.
2. University Dining Halls
The Internal Revenue Code contains a special exception to the
UBIT for services that certain classes of exempt nonprofits operate
"for the convenience of" individuals whom the nonprofits serve or
employ.73 Critics have charged that the various services exempted in
70 On the economic role of nonprofit arts institutions generally, see Hansmann, supra note
38, at 854-59.
71 It is sometimes said that the proceeds from museum sales of art reproductions are
exempted because selling reproductions helps promote the educational function that the
museum is said to serve. This justification is unpersuasive. For one thing, it would seem to
extend to the sale of any reproductions, not just those of works in the museum's own
collection. Furthermore, it would also seem to call for exempting from corporate taxation the
earnings that for-profit shops receive from the sale of art reproductions.
72 These criteria include, for example, whether or not the object sold bears the museum's
logo and whether or not the object is "utilitarian." See B. Hopkins, supra note 16, at 739.
73 I.R.C. § 513(a)(2) (1982).
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the convenience exception should be subject to the UBIT.74 Student
dining halls operated by universities illustrate the issues involved in
that claim.
Taxation of the income from university dining services might be
supported with logic similar to that just outlined in the case of
museum gift shops. Operation of a restaurant generally would not
qualify for exemption if undertaken by a nonprofit corporation organ-
ized and operated exclusively for that purpose (that is, a restaurant
would not pass a "stand-alone" test). Consequently, there is a pre-
sumption for subjecting food services to the UBIT even when they are
operated by an otherwise exempt university. The fact that in most
instances it should be relatively easy for universities to account sepa-
rately for income and expenses associated with their dining hall oper-
ations makes the case for taxation even stronger. Moreover, the
UBIT would help to discourage universities from expanding their
food services beyond the point where they experience economies of
scope.
There are, however, at least two arguments for treating university
dining services differently from the approach suggested above for
museum gift shops and for continuing to exempt them from the
UBIT, at least so long as they do not make substantial sales to the
public at large.
First, subsidizing food services for students furthers the underlying
purposes of the basic exemption for educational services. Presumably
the reason that educational institutions are exempted from tax is that,
in the absence of subsidy, too little education will be consumed.75
Any subsidy to services that must be consumed jointly with education
will serve the same purpose. Students, of course, must eat. Conse-
quently, a subsidy to food consumed by students will serve as an indi-
rect subsidy to the consumption of education. Thus, exemption of
student food services will further the purposes of the basic exemption
74 See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 5, at 106 (testimony of Frank Swain, Chief Counsel for
Advocacy, U.S. Small Business Administration).
75 The best argument to support public subsidy to education is not, as is commonly
supposed, that the education an individual acquires yields substantial external benefits to
society at large since (at least short of the graduate level) education is overwhelmingly a
private good. Rather, it is that an individual's inability to borrow against the human capital
she accumulates in school, as well as the impracticality of devising contracts for insurance on
the returns to investment in such capital, will commonly lead individuals to underconsume
education even when it is viewed as a private good. See Hansmann, supra note 38, at 859-62.
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for educational institutions.76 (This argument might even be taken so
far as to support a stand-alone exemption for organizations that pro-
vide no educational services but simply sell food exclusively to
students.)
Second, economies of scope are so strong in this situation that uni-
versities are likely to provide food services regardless of whether the
UBIT is applied to them. Moreover, if dining hall services were
taxed, universities might simply adjust their dining hall fees to elimi-
nate taxable net income and then increase tuition or other nontaxable
charges correspondingly. Thus, application of the UBIT here might
yield very little revenue and lead to no appreciable change in the
extent of the dining services operated by universities." Rather, it
might simply reduce universities' flexibility in setting their fee struc-
tures and also increase administrative expenses for both universities
and the IRS. Moreover, there is another natural point at which to
draw the line between taxable and nontaxable food services-namely,
at the point at which universities begin selling food to the public at
large in appreciable quantities. This is probably the point where econ-
omies of scope rapidly disappear, and beyond which universities
should not be encouraged to expand. Consequently, there is a reason-
able case to be made for applying the UBIT to university dining halls
only when they engage in substantial sales to the public.78
76 The same logic does not necessarily extend to cafeterias operated by art museums, at least
if one accepts the marginal-cost-below-average-cost rationale for exemption described supra
notes 69-71 and accompanying text. This would be true, moreover, even if it were generally
necessary to eat while visiting an art museum. So long as the charge for viewing the art itself is
set at marginal cost-which in most cases is close to zero-the level of consumption will be
efficient, and there is no justification for further subsidy. Moreover, most art museums already
are either free or charge only a minimal entrance fee that is not used in any important way to
cover the cost of acquiring art.
Nevertheless, the House Committee proposals in Draft Report, supra note 5, at 44-45,
specifically call for continuing exemption for museum cafeterias.
77 On the other hand, although universities might establish student dining halls whether or
not they are subject to the UBIT, it does not follow that the universities themselves will
necessarily operate those services. Instead, they could license a for-profit food service firm to
operate the dining halls for them. A university might be more inclined to contract out in this
fashion if their dining services were subject to the UBIT, and this weighs in favor of
application of that tax.
78 The reforms recently recommended by the House Subcommittee on Oversight are
roughly consistent with this latter line of argument. They call for repeal of the convenience
exception in general but recommend that exemption be continued for, among other things,
food services that a university provides to its students on its premises. Draft Report, supra
note 5, at 44-45.
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X. REFORMING THE SCOPE OF THE BASIC EXEMPTION
Although only modest reforms are called for in the UBIT, the same
is not true of the basic nonprofit exemption to which the UBIT is
appended. At present, many tax-exempt nonprofits-including per-
haps most nonprofit hospitals, health maintenance organizations, and
nursing homes-arguably serve no significant function beyond selling,
on a commercial basis, services of a kind and quality that are also
provided by profit-seeking firms. 9 This raises a serious question as to
whether tax exemption should be withdrawn from most or all of the
nonprofit firms in such industries.80 Congress has already taken a first
step in this direction with the Tax Reform Act of 1986,1 which with-
drew exemption from nonprofit life and health insurance companies.8 2
Public debate should now focus on deciding whether the scope of the
basic exemption should be even further rationalized and contracted.8 3
This is an issue of far greater significance than the UBIT, and one that




Although the academic literature has frequently viewed the UBIT
with attitudes ranging from skepticism to hostility, analysis reinforces
what common sense suggests: the UBIT serves an important function
in avoiding inefficient distortions in the organization of economic
79 Clark, Does the Nonprofit Form Fit the Hospital Industry? 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1416
(1980); Hansmann, Economic Theories of Nonprofit Organization, in The Nonprofit Sector: A
Research Handbook 27 (W. Powell ed. 1987); Hansmann, supra note 38, at 863-68.
80 Rep. Fortney H. Stark (D.-Cal.), the Chairman of the Health Subcommittee of the House
Ways and Means Committee, has already suggested that tax exemption should be withdrawn
from nonprofit hospitals. Tax Exemption for Nonprofit Hospitals Assailed, N.Y. Times, July
15, 1987, at A21, col. 1.
81 Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (to be codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
82 I.R.C. § 510(m) (West 1988).
83 This is an important issue, not just at the federal level but also at the state level, where
courts and legislatures are beginning to question seriously the current broad scope of tax
exemption for nonprofits. See, e.g., Utah County v. Intermountain Health Care, 709 P.2d 265
(Utah 1985) (substantially narrowing criteria for property tax exemption for nonprofit
hospitals); Broaddus, For-Profit Backlash: Legislatures in Thirty-Two States Have Challenged
the Tax Exemption of Nonprofits-and Are Redefining Charity in the Process, Foundation
News, March/April 1988, at 51.
84 For an analysis of the policy underlying the basic exemption and some suggested
guidelines for reform, see Hansmann, Exempting Rationale, supra note 40.
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activity. On the other hand, despite the substantial agitation from the
small business community recently pressing for broader application of
the UBIT, there seems to be room for only modest reform in that
direction. The truly difficult and important issue involving the tax
treatment of nonprofits concerns not the UBIT but rather the scope of
the basic exemption that underlies it, and that is where future debate
should focus.

